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Abstract
It is shown that the interactive error correction protocol ‘CASCADE’ should be
analyzed taking the correlation between passes and finite length of sequence into
account. Furthermore we mention some problems in quantifying the reduction of
Renyi entropy by information announced during the error correction process.
1 Introduction
The CASCADE protocol for error correction was studied by Brassard and Salvail [1] who
gave asymptotic estimates of its success probability and the number of information bits
leaked during protocol execution. In a practical implementation of CASCADE, with a
fixed number of passes and a finite length sequence, we show that calculation of the success
probability and number of information bits leaked are very involved problems which have
not been properly addressed so far. Even the estimates in [1] are made under what may
be called an ‘independent pass’ approximation because the correlation between operations
taking place at different passes of the protocol has been neglected. On the implementation
side, we study practically important parameters such as the communication complexity
and the round-trip delay time of CASCADE.
For cryptographic purposes, in both classical and quantum protocols, one is interested
in the Renyi information leakage from public discussion during the error correction pro-
cess. This is because the standard privacy amplification theorem [2] requires the Renyi
entropy before privacy amplification to be known. Such estimates of Renyi entropy re-
duction, especially for the case of identical individual attacks by Eve, have been studied
by Cachin and Maurer [3], who claimed to show that for linear error-correcting codes, the
Renyi entropy reduction is roughly equal to the number of announced bits. We explain
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why this claim is incorrect. However, we suggest that covering the announced bits with
a pre-shared secret key would result in no Renyi entropy reduction and can be used as
long as the net key generation rate remains positive. For CASCADE, for which the Renyi
entropy reduction has not been studied, we suggest a similar procedure. In doing so, we
find that, unlike the case of linear error-correcting codes, there is still an entropy reduction
that is difficult to quantify.
2 CASCADE PROTOCOL
2.1 ‘Independent Pass’ and ‘Infinite-length Sequence’ Approxi-
mation
The CASCADE protocol proceeds in several passes in which block-parity conparison and
binary-search-type error correction are executed. CASCADE uses correlation between the
sequences of passes, so that it performs better as to the number of announced bits during
the error correction process than the BBBSS protocol[4] which is also based on parity
check and binary search, but does not use the correlation of sequences. Upper bounds on
the number of announced bits were derived in [1]. The number of announced bits seems
to depend heavily on error patterns and permutation functions used to produce sequences
of all passes. Furthermore the process is nonlinear. Therefore, the expected value should
be obtained by averaging the number of announced bits of all specific error patters and
permutation functions. However, the upper bound on the number of announced bits
was derived by calculating expected amount of announced bits pass by pass. That is, the
correlation of sequences was not considered. We performed computer simulation 1,000,000
times to analyze the performance of CASCADE. The number of announced bits during
the error correction process obtained by the computer simulation is shown in Tab.1. The
upper bound derived in [1] is also shown in the bracket. It is found that the upper
bound is very close to the simulation brackets. In the case that the private channel error
probability ε is 0.05 and 0.1, the simulation results are larger than the upper bound. This
indicates that a nonrigorous method was used to derive the upper bound.
In [1], the size of a block for each pass was designed so that the number of errors
contained in a block of the initial pass reduces to less than half as passes proceed. However,
the success probability was discussed in [1] on the basis of 100 empirical tests in which
all errors were corrected at the end of the protocol. Analysis of the success probability is
very complicated. Only a slight difference of error positions may determine whether the
protocol succeeds or fails. We have not derived the probability that CASCASE protocol
succeeds. In this situation, the results of a large number of computer simulations may help
us to understand its properties. The protocol failure probability obtained by averaging
the results of 1,000,000 computer simulation is shown in Tab.2. It is found that the
protocol failure probability reduces as the sequence length becomes longer. Furthermore
it is found that the failure probability decreases as the error probability of the private
channel increases. According to our computer simulation, we found that the average
number of errors remaining after pass 2 is almost the same in the range from 0.3 to 0.37.
As the error probability of the private channel decreases, block sizes become longer and
the number of blocks decreases, so that the probability that two or more of the remaining
errors move to the same block in the next pass becomes large. Then, the protocol failure
probability increases. From this result, the protocol failure probability should be analysed
for sequences with finite length and asymptotic limits are not reliable.
Table 1: Number of Announced Bits during Error Correction
n ε = 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.15
100 13.43(9.33) 35.37(33.14) 59.3(57) 77.56(82.4)
200 20.64(18.66) 69.3(66.29) 117.39(114) 153.86(164.8)
500 45.93(46.64) 170.12(165.71) 288.67(285) 384.76(412)
1000 90.99(93.29) 339.01(331.43) 576.53(570) 768.19(824)
2000 182.16(186.58) 677.25(662.86) 1151.7(1140) 1536.02(1648)
5000 454.38(466.44) 1692.09(1657.14) 2878.41(2850) 3839.52(4120)
10000 906.18(932.88) 3382.11(3314.29) 5753.93(5700) 7678.68(8240)
ε: error probability of private channel, n: sequence length.
The upper bound [1] is given in parentheses.
Table 2: Protocol Failure Probability of CASCADE
ε n=100 200 500 1000 2000 5000 10000
0.01 0.023603 0.056623 0.078354 0.044117 0.011357 0.002677 0.001005
0.05 0.072621 0.038288 0.005492 0.001657 0.000355 0.000075 0.000066
0.1 0.032161 0.009446 0.001129 0.000349 0.000119 0.000009 0.000011
0.15 0.016245 0.006394 0.000415 0.000158 0.000039 0 0.00001
ε: error probability of private channel, n: sequence length.
2.2 Communication Complexity
For interactive error correction like CASCADE, a round-trip is necessary for comparing
block and sub-block parities. From a practical viewpoint, time for the round-trips should
be considered in evaluating the net key generation rate. The number of round-trips is
shown in Tab.3 for CASCADE and BBBSS protocol which does not use the correlation
between sequences[4]. It is found in Tab.3 that the number of the round-trip increases as
error probability of the private channel becomes large and the sequence length becomes
longer, and it is almost proportionally to the sequence length in CASCADE, while that
of BBBSS protocol is almost constant. The difference comes from the fact that each error
has to be corrected one by one after pass two in CASCADE, while errors can be corrected
simultaneously in each pass in BBBSS protocol. It is found that as sifted key generation
rate over a private channel increases, error correction process would dominate the net key
generation rate, especially for CASCADE.
Table 3: Number of Round Trips
CASCADE BBBSS
n ε0.01 0.05 0.1 0.14 0.01 0.1 0.1 0.15
500 26.12 58.66 81.95 105.21 26.08 36.04 38.77 38.57
1000 42.70 107.41 154.89 202.34 33.26 44.16 47.60 47.56
2000 74.86 205.09 300.89 396.46 42.47 54.17 57.87 57.17
5000 170.21 498.91 739.75 979.01 56.20 68.58 72.29 71.17
10000 329.23 987.53 1470.49 1949.51 67.42 80.14 82.73 82.27
3 REDUCTION OF RENYI ENTROPY BY ERROR
CORRECTION
The amount of information leaked during the error correction process would reduce Eve’s
Renyi entropy about the legitimate users’ sequence. The precise estimation of the amount
of this reduction is very important for evaluating the key generation rate. It was shown
in Th. 9 of [3] that in the case where the raw key is generated by many independent
repetitions of a random experiment, each bit leaked during the error correction process
reduces Eve’s Renyi entropy by only about one. The properties of the so-called ǫ-strongly
typical sequences defined below are used to prove this result.
Definition 1 (ǫ-strongly typical set[3]) Let X be a random variable distributed ac-
cording to PX over some finite set X where it is assumed that PX(x) > 0 for all x ∈X .
Let xn = [x1, ..., xn] be a sequence of n digits of X and define Na(x
n) to be the number of
occurrences of the symbol a ∈X in the sequence xn. A sequence xn ∈X n is called ǫ-strongly
typical if and only if (1− ǫ)PX(a) ≤
Na(xn)
n
≤ (1 + ǫ)PX(a) for all a ∈X .
It was claimed that the occurrence probability of each sequence in the ǫ-strongly
typical set is asymptotically identical, and this property was used to prove Th. 9 in
[3]. This claim is wrong, however – the ratio of the maximum occurrence probability of
a sequence in the ǫ-strongly typical set to the minimum one increases as the sequence
length becomes longer[5]. For the binary case, assuming that PX(0) = p(≤ 1/2), the
ratio is (1−p
p
)2npǫ. As an example, let us consider the case that n=100,000, PX(0)=0.1,
ǫ=0.01. The minimum occurrence probability PminXn (x
n) = 2.52 × 10−14214, the maximum
PmaxXn (x
n) = 1.78×10−14023, then the ratio PmaxXn (x
n)/PminXn (x
n) = 7.06×10190. In this case,
the probability Pr [Xn ∈ Sn(ǫ)] that the sequence is in a ǫ-strongly typical set Sn(ǫ) is
0.711. Therefore, Th. 9 does not apply to this case. The amount of information additional
to that predicted by Th. 9 can be obtained by Th. 6 of [3]. We find the upper bound on
the reduction of Eve’s Renyi entropy is 2485 bits more than that predicted by Th. 9.
Next, let us consider the case that the legitimate users cover the announced bits by a
pre-shared secret key. The covered announced bits never reduces Eve’s Renyi entropy for
error correction by non-interactive linear code. This is because the pre-shared secret key
and the announced bits are mutually independent. Then, the reduction of the size of the
final key by the error correction process is just as the same as the number of announced
bits. In the case of interactive error correction, however, it is not apparent whether the
announced bits reduce Eve’s Renyi entropy or not, because interactive error correction
reveals possible information on the positions of all errors, which could help Eve. Thus,
it should be verified that this problem is addressed in, e.g., [6], where the security of
CASCADE using the above method of covering the parity information has been studied.
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